A Blockchain-Based Mutual Authentication Method to Secure the Electric Vehicles' TPMS

Despite the widespread use of radio frequency identification and wireless connectivity such as near field communication in electric vehicles, their security and privacy implications in Ad-Hoc networks have not been well explored. This article provides a data protection assessment of radio frequency electronic system in the tire pressure monitoring system (TPMS). It is demonstrated that eavesdropping is completely feasible from a passing car, at an approximate distance up to 50 m. Furthermore, our reverse analysis shows that the static n-bit signatures and messaging can be eavesdropped from a relatively far distance, raising privacy concerns as a vehicles' movements can be tracked by using the unique IDs of tire pressure sensors. Unfortunately, current protocols do not use authentication, and automobile technologies hardly follow routine message confirmation so sensor messages may be spoofed remotely. To improve the security of TPMS, we suggest a novel ultralightweight mutual authentication for the TPMS registry process in the automotive network. Our experimental results confirm the effectiveness and security of the proposed method in TPMS.