TY - JOUR
T1 - A review of likelihood ratios in forensic science based on a critique of Stiffelman “No longer the Gold standard
T2 - Probabilistic genotyping is changing the nature of DNA evidence in criminal trials”
AU - Buckleton, John
AU - Robertson, Bernard
AU - Curran, James
AU - Berger, Charles
AU - Taylor, Duncan
AU - Bright, Jo Anne
AU - Hicks, Tacha
AU - Gittelson, Simone
AU - Evett, Ian
AU - Pugh, Simone
AU - Jackson, Graham
AU - Kelly, Hannah
AU - Kalafut, Tim
AU - Bieber, Frederick R.
PY - 2020/5
Y1 - 2020/5
N2 - Stiffelman [1] gives a broad critique of the application of likelihood ratios (LRs) in forensic science, in particular their use in probabilistic genotyping (PG) software. These are discussed in this review. LRs do not infringe on the ultimate issue. The Bayesian paradigm clearly separates the role of the scientist from that of the decision makers and distances the scientist from comment on the ultimate and subsidiary issues. LRs do not affect the reasonable doubt standard. Fact finders must still make decisions based on all the evidence and they must do this considering all evidence, not just that given probabilistically. LRs do not infringe on the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence does not equate with a prior probability of zero but simply that the person of interest (POI) is no more likely than anyone else to be the donor. Propositions need to be exhaustive within the context of the case. That is, propositions deemed relevant by either defense or prosecution which are not fanciful must not be omitted from consideration.
AB - Stiffelman [1] gives a broad critique of the application of likelihood ratios (LRs) in forensic science, in particular their use in probabilistic genotyping (PG) software. These are discussed in this review. LRs do not infringe on the ultimate issue. The Bayesian paradigm clearly separates the role of the scientist from that of the decision makers and distances the scientist from comment on the ultimate and subsidiary issues. LRs do not affect the reasonable doubt standard. Fact finders must still make decisions based on all the evidence and they must do this considering all evidence, not just that given probabilistically. LRs do not infringe on the presumption of innocence. The presumption of innocence does not equate with a prior probability of zero but simply that the person of interest (POI) is no more likely than anyone else to be the donor. Propositions need to be exhaustive within the context of the case. That is, propositions deemed relevant by either defense or prosecution which are not fanciful must not be omitted from consideration.
KW - Exhaustiveness
KW - Likelihood ratio
KW - Presumption of innocence
KW - Reasonable doubt
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85081910083&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.forsciint.2020.110251
DO - 10.1016/j.forsciint.2020.110251
M3 - Article
C2 - 32203853
AN - SCOPUS:85081910083
VL - 310
JO - Forensic Science International
JF - Forensic Science International
SN - 0379-0738
M1 - 110251
ER -