Last-Minute Bidding in Sequential Auctions with Unobserved, Stochastic Entry

Kenneth Hendricks, Ilke Onur, Thomas Wiseman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

5 Citations (Scopus)


Using a dataset of calculator auctions on eBay, we first show that last-minute bidding is not merely the result of bidders' going to the next-to-close auction. Instead, bidding is concentrated at the end of the period in which the auction is the next to close, suggesting the existence of strategic last-minute bidding. Then, we model repeated, ascending price auctions for homogeneous goods with unobserved, stochastic entry. We show that the dynamic game has a pure-strategy symmetric equilibrium in which entrants always reveal themselves by bidding in the auction in which they arrive, and bidding occurs at the last minute.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-19
Number of pages19
JournalReview of Industrial Organization
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Feb 2012
Externally publishedYes


  • eBay
  • Last-minute bidding
  • Sequential auctions


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