In 'The Power of God' (Gleeson 2010) I elaborate and defend an argument by the late D.Z. Phillips against definitions of omnipotence in terms of logical possibility. In 'Which God? What Power? A Response to Andrew Gleeson' (Hasker 2010), William Hasker criticizes my defense of Phillips' argument. Here I contend his criticisms do not succeed. I distinguish three definitions of omnipotence in terms of logical possibility. Hasker agrees that the first fails. The second fails because negative properties (like disembodiedment and simplicity) do not amount to a nature that licenses the attribution of causal powers. The third fails because it does not identify actions that can be performed without a body. It cannot be saved by appeal to the idea of purely mental acts.
|Number of pages
|Sophia: International Journal For Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysical Theology and Ethics
|Published - Dec 2010
- Logical possibility