Pluralism

This chapter deals with “pluralism” in the sense of “value pluralism.” Isaiah Berlin argues that pluralism in this sense opposes moral monism, according to which a single value or system of values overrides all others, a view that has been used historically to justify oppressive political regimes. The truth is that the most fundamental human values are objective but also irreducibly plural, frequently in conflict, and “incommensurable” with one another. Berlin sees this picture as indicating a broad case for liberalism. However, the question arises as to why, if value pluralism is true, the values of liberalism should be emphasized in preference to those of other political views. The chapter goes on to examine three principal answers to that question given by Berlin and other pluralist writers (some of whom reach non-liberal conclusions): agonistic, contextual, and conceptual. Agonism is rejected, and contextualism is accepted but its limitations are noted, and a case is made for the conceptual approach as a more reliable foundation for liberalism.