Pluralism, Kant and Progress

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Vittorio Hösle's reply helpfully clarifies his ethical position but raises three questions from a value-pluralist point of view. First, is the Kantian starting point he proposes a monist position that undercuts the value pluralism to which he says he is committed? Second, in what sense does he accept the central pluralist idea of the incommensurability of values? In particular, what kind of constraint does he believe this places on the rank ordering of values? The formulations he offers are ambiguous between allowing contextual ordering, which is widely endorsed by pluralists, and permitting a comprehensive order that applies in all cases, which most pluralists would reject. Third, Hösle's commitment to the cause of progress is admirable, but how can this be squared with pluralism? Here, I return to the broad approaches to the problem of pluralist ranking that I identified in my original reply to Hösle.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)191-197
Number of pages7
JournalAnalyse & Kritik
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2018


  • Vittorio Hosle
  • Value pluralism
  • Isaiah Berlin
  • Immanuel Kant
  • incommensurability
  • liberalism
  • value pluralism
  • Bernard Williams
  • progress
  • Vittorio Hösle


Dive into the research topics of 'Pluralism, Kant and Progress'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this