Strategic alliance, agency problems, and labor investment efficiency

Wenrui Chen, Zhiwu Chen, Ling Qin, Yaowen Shan, Weihang Xu

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

Inter-firm strategic alliances, which are formed to facilitate resource allocation and improve efficiency, may also inadvertently lead to labor investment inefficiencies due to increased agency conflicts and managerial opportunism. Using a sample of Chinese firms, we find that strategic alliances significantly reduce labor investment efficiency by 4.5%. The reduction in labor investment efficiency takes the form of reduced revenue-generating capacity per unit of labor, overhiring of labor, and increased labor cost stickiness. Consistent with the agency view, we find that the negative effects of strategic alliances are more pronounced under weak corporate governance and high information asymmetry among alliance partners. Overall, the results highlight the complex dynamics of inter-firm strategic alliances and provide practical insights for improving labor investment efficiency in the context of inter-firm cooperation.

Original languageEnglish
Article number106809
Number of pages14
JournalEconomic Modelling
Volume139
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Oct 2024

Keywords

  • Agency problems
  • Informed decision making
  • Labor investment efficiency
  • Strategic alliances

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