The Double Intentionality of Emotional Experience

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    Abstract

    I argue that while the feeling of bodily responses is not necessary to emotion, these feelings contribute significant meaningful content to everyday emotional experience. Emotional bodily feelings represent a ‘state of self’, analysed as a sense of one's body affording certain patterns of interaction with the environment. Recognising that there are two sources of intentional content in everyday emotional experience allows us to reconcile the diverging intuitions that people have about emotional states, and to understand better the long-standing debate between bodily feeling-based and appraisal-based theories of emotion.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1454-1475
    Number of pages22
    JournalEUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
    Volume25
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2017

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