The Strong Versions of Embodied Cognition: Three Challenges Faced

The aim of this article is to discuss three challenges to the so-called “strong” versions of embodiment. The strong versions of embodied cognition (SVEC) have been successful in explaining how concrete concepts (e.g., pencil) may be understood based on sensory processes, yet they have failed to offer a comprehensive understanding of abstract concepts (e.g., freedom). In this regard, this article pinpoints three areas where the SVEC face limitations. First, the SVEC fail to fully support the active or passive perspective that an agent may assume when processing abstract concepts via embodied metaphorical representations. Second, theSVECdonot offer a compelling explanation for three different types of mental simulation proposed for the representation of nonactual motion semantics: enactive perception, perceptual scanning, and imagination. Third, theSVECfail to account for inter-individual, cross-cultural, and context-dependency in the representation of abstract concepts. To summarize, we argue that the findings from the SVEC should be integrated into broader “weak” embodiment theoretical perspectives, which propose that sensory–motor and modality-independent systems are involved in conceptual representations. Finally, we discuss the implications of our core argument in cognitive neuroscience.